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Economic Globalization and Bolivia's Regional Divide
By: Kathleen Schroeder
Abstract
Bolivia provides an example of the immense complexity of local responses to globalization. 
This paper emphasizes the regional differences that influence how Bolivians react to 
economic globalization and in particular to the terms of sale of natural gas. Some high-land 
indigenous communities contest aspects of the neo-liberal global economy while many in 
the lowland mestizo class embrace opportunities that come from participation in the global 
economy. The election of Evo Morales in 2006 has brought many of these differences to the 
forefront because he has vowed to favor domestic consumption of natural gas over export 
and take seriously the state’s responsibilities to the poor. Keywords: Bolivia, globalization, 
Evo Morales.
Resumen
El caso de Bolivia sirve como muestra de la inmensa complejidad que existe en las respu-estas 
locales a la globalización. Este trabajo se enfoca en las diferencias regionales que influyen en la 
reacción de los bolivianos a la globalización económica, especialmente con respecto a las 
condiciones para la venta del gas natural. Algunas comunidades indígenas de las tierras altas 
disputan ciertas características de la economía global neoliberal, mien-tras que muchos grupos de 
las tierras bajas, donde predomina la clase mestiza, están a favor de las oportunidades que surgen 
de la participación en la economía global. La elec-ción de Evo Morales en 2006 hace resaltar 
muchas de estas diferencias debido a su de-cisión de cumplir con las responsabilidades del estado 
hacía los pobres y su compromiso de promover el consumo doméstico, y no la exportación, del 
gas natural.
Kathleen Schroeder (2007) "Economic Globalization and Bolivia's Regional Divide" Journal of 
Latin American Geography Volume 6 Issue 2 pp. 99-120.  Version of Record Available from 
(www.muse.jhu.edu)
Introduction 
In recent decades, Latin America has experienced a growing number of  social 
and political movements with roots in indigenous communities from Chiapas, Mexico, 
to southern Chile (Delgado 1994, Langer 2003, Stephenson 2002, Yashar 1998). In Bo-
livia, indigenous peoples played a critical role in deposing President Gonzalo Sánchez de 
Lozada (widely known by his nickname Goni) in October of  2003, in part, because he 
supported a neoliberal plan to engage in the international sale of  natural gas. In January 
of  2006, Bolivia’s first indigenous president, Evo Morales, was sworn into office.  On 
May 1st of  2006, he acted on a campaign promise that supported the nationalization of  
the country’s natural gas fields. Many Bolivia watchers saw the nationalization of  the gas 
fields as an attack on previous administrations’ neo-liberal agenda of  economic global-
ization.
June Nash (2001), a leading scholar on Bolivia, turns her attention to Chiapas, 
Mexico in Mayan Visions: The Quest for Autonomy in an Age of  Globalization. The insights she 
gains from her work in highland Chiapas contribute substantially to our understanding 
of  the situation in contemporary Bolivia. In particular, Nash emphasizes a definition of  
globalization which stresses integration of  the global economy and in particular, a shift 
from domestic production to export production. This model assumes a free and self-reg-
ulating market that operates outside the control of  national and international regulatory 
agencies. This free and self-regulating market coexists with an economic and political 
model that sells off  public enterprises and decreases government responsibility for the 
poor (Nash 2001, 3). Working in Bolivia, Gill (2000) has called the state’s abdication of  
responsibility for welfare the “armed retreat of  the Bolivian state.” 
Opposition to export promotion at the expense of  domestic consumption in the 
gas industry was a key motivator of  Evo Morales’ supporters (Kohl and Farthing 2006). 
But a variety of  complex issues helped bring Evo Morales into office. Indigenous resis-
tance to globalization has captured headlines across the world and the election of  Evo 
Morales has once again made Bolivia an international symbol of  the anti-globalization 
movement. However, it is important to note that most indigenous Bolivians do not sim-
ply reject an abstract idea of  “globalization.” They reject a neo-liberal economic agenda 
which continues to privilege the elite. Indigenous Bolivians do not oppose engagement in 
the global economy. They oppose engagement that continues to disadvantage them.
In Bolivia, some indigenous communities have organized to resist aspects of  the 
neo-liberal global economy while many within the mestizo class embrace the opportuni-
ties that come from participation in global markets. Geographically, the movement for 
indigenous nationalism is located most strongly on the Bolivian altiplano (high plateau), 
in the valley city of  Cochabamba, and in the lowland coca-growing Chapare. The grow-
ing mestizo movement is strongly associated with the lowland city of  Santa Cruz, to a 
lesser extent the city of  Tarija, and the eastern flanks of  the country. The eastern region 
of  Bolivia is much more eager to embrace the neo-liberal agenda for economic global-
ization. The city of  Santa Cruz is the center of  the autonomy movement and home 
to people well prepared to profit from economic globalization. This case from Bolivia 
highlights the complexity of  the globalization debate by examining two clearly defined 
and regionally based paths for the future of  the country. 
Bolivia has always been a multi-ethnic country with strong regional characteris-
tics. Many scholars have examined the cultural and regional tensions at work in Bolivia 
especially those between highland and lowland Bolivians. Stearman (1985) focuses on 
the integration of  highland Bolivians as they migrated to lowland cities such as Santa 
Cruz. Schroeder (1998) examines how former tin-miners from the highlands shifted oc-
cupations and adjusted to life in the lowland city of  Tarija. A sophisticated analysis of  
Bolivia’s regionalism by José Luis Roca (1999) explains the complicated geography of  the 
country and provides insight into how distinct regional cultures impact Bolivia’s political 
reality. In general, people of  the highlands have strong ties to distinct indigenous groups 
(in particular Quechua and Aymara peoples), while those of  the eastern lowlands have a 
stronger mestizo culture.   
Keeling’s 2004 discussion of  globalization published in this journal frames this 
paper by providing a clear theoretical and practical analysis of  the implications of  glo-
balization for Latin America. He differentiates among a variety of  critical impacts that 
globalization is having in the region. Keeling calls for the use of  the term “glocalization” 
to call attention to the local adaptations and implications of  globalization. The case study 
I provide from Bolivia provides a “glocalized” analysis of  the “growing polarization of  
society” and “conflicting socio-cultural identities” that Keeling identifies.  The Boliv-
ian case makes clear that local people are aware of  the impacts of  globalization and are 
struggling to control these processes. Bolivia also provides an example of  the immense 
complexity of  local responses to globalization. Some of  this complexity has a regional 
pattern, as surely some parts of  Bolivia are better situated to benefit from engagement in 
the global economy. However, many surprises and contradictions exist.  
Based on the premise that neoliberal economic reforms will eventually benefit 
even the poorest of  the poor, many Latin American economies (including Bolivia’s) have 
withstood long periods of  “adjustment” that have resulted in what Keeling describes 
as a growing (economic) polarization. I would add that, in the case of  Bolivia at least, a 
regional polarization is also occurring. During the 1980s, Bolivia’s state employees were 
one key target of  reform measures. Displaced state employees (particularly tin miners 
from the state-owned mines in the highlands) have played important roles in an authentic 
Bolivian resistance to income inequality, which has recently contributed to the election of  
the populist indigenous president Evo Morales. 
Bolivian socio-cultural identities are deeply complex and influenced from numer-
ous sources. These too are spatially rooted. Much as Keeling describes, a part of  the 
Bolivian population embraces an identity, “that is constructed by individual success, in-
novative entrepreneurialism, the conspicuous consumption of  global products” (2004, 
14) and the like. Another segment of  the Bolivian population embraces its traditional
roots and demands that the needs of  poor not be ignored.  As these factions of  the 
Bolivian population collide, geographical patterns emerge, including a serious discussion 
over regional autonomy that is threatening to drive the country even further apart.  
A growing body of  evidence indicates a widening political and economic gulf  
between Bolivia’s highlands and lowlands (Lowrey 2006). Bolivia seems on the verge of  
being torn apart by separate visions for its future.  Indigenous groups in the highlands 
and mestizo groups in the lowlands both appeal to a strong sense of  place-based identity 
as they apply pressure on the central government to further their separate and non-com-
patible political and economic agendas. In many ways, two Bolivias exist: one that is eager 
to embrace the global economy, and another Bolivia that honors the traditional Andean 
moral economies (Edelman 2005, Scott 1976).  
This paper emphasizes the regional differences that are influencing how Bolivia 
reacts to economic globalization. It begins with a discussion of  the rebirth of  Aymara 
nationalism in Bolivia, within the context of  how the struggle to preserve highland cul-
ture contributed to the political and economic agenda of  Evo Morales’ MAS Party and 
the eventual nationalization of  the country’s gas fields. Next, the paper focuses on the 
growing frustration of  lowland mestizos. Many of  the lowlanders, including mestizos 
but also some of  the indigenous Guaraní population, want greater regional autonomy 
and more control over the export of  the natural gas that is found in their region. An 
explanation of  the 2003 ouster of  President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada is offered, as 
the moment when long-simmering tensions between the two Bolivias exploded. Over 
two separate Presidential terms, Sánchez de Lozada represented the views of  mestizo, 
neoliberal, pro-economic globalization, potentially gas-rich eastern Bolivia against the 
indigenous peoples of  the highlands. The aftermath of  the post-Goni era is examined by 
an analysis of  regional patterns evident in the 2004 Gas Referendum and the Presidential 
Election of  2005. The article concludes with comments on the nationalization of  the 
natural gas fields and the challenges ahead for President Morales. 
Economic Globalization in the Highlands
Andean nationalism not only has deep roots, it has serious economic and political 
implications for the future of  Bolivia. Resistance to economic globalization in the Andes 
is rooted in the fact that the global economy is doing very little to help rural indigenous 
people and may even be increasing their poverty. In some areas of  Bolivia, there has been 
a measurable and substantial reduction in poverty during the decade after 1991 (INE 
2001). However, reduction of  poverty in Bolivia shows significant regional differences, 
with the eastern part of  the country faring better than the highlands. In addition, urban 
areas have done better than rural zones. Areas that have seen increases in poverty from 
1991 to 2001 are almost exclusively highland, rural and indigenous (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Change in Poverty 1991-2001. Source: INE 2001. 
Looked at another way, Bolivians who consider themselves indigenous (especially 
in the rural highlands) are doing more poorly than those who consider themselves mesti-
zo. Indigenous families have lower levels of  material wealth, sanitation and housing qual-
ity than non-indigenous families (Liberato, Pomeroy and Fennell 2006). These tangible 
differences in people’s quality of  life have had a profound impact on the country. The 
rural highland population is fighting a real, and by all appearances, losing battle against 
poverty, while facing increasing pressures to engage in the global economic system. 
Katarismo on the Altiplano 
Indigenous movements in Bolivia are centered on the altiplano and in particular 
the cities of  La Paz and El Alto. This region is home to several hundred thousand Ayma-
ra-speakers (Canessa 2000, 120). Indigenous peoples in the highland city of  El Alto have 
been particularly active in organizing against neoliberal economic policies (Gill 2000). 
Cochabamba, another city with strong indigenous political movements, is the home of  
tens of  thousands of  tin miners who were displaced during the economic crises of  the 
1980s and subsequent mine closures (Crabtree, Duff  and Pearce 1987). Bolivian min-
ers are a notoriously well-organized and a politically savvy group with strong Quechua 
roots (Dunkerley 1984, Nash 1979). Morales’ first political experiences were working 
with coca-growers in the Chapare, a region near the city of  Cochabamba that absorbed 
many of  the displaced miners (Orozco Ramírez 2005).
A rebirth of  indigenous nationalism, known as Katarismo, led by students, intel-
lectuals, and peasants, began in the 1970s in La Paz to help preserve what was left of  the 
traditional culture of  the altiplano (Mallon 1992). This movement reclaimed Katari as a 
symbol to help reinvigorate indigenous culture. Interest in traditional languages such as 
Aymara and Quechua grew, as did appreciation for traditional music and craft produc-
tion. The movement had a political wing, and many of  Bolivia’s indigenous leaders today 
took inspiration and gained political experience from the Kataristas of  the 1970s (García 
Linera 2003).  
Kataristas demand status equal to the dominant mestizo class. This counter-he-
gemonic movement took its inspiration and name from Julián Apaza, who later changed 
his name to Túpac Katari, the Aymara leader who launched an anti-colonial campaign on 
the high plains two hundred years before. Túpac Katari led both a military and a symbolic 
campaign against Spaniards and their culture. Among other cultural stances, the move-
ment prohibited Andean people from practicing European customs such as speaking 
Spanish or eating European foods, such as wheat bread (Mallon 1992). Katari is most fa-
mous for his role in the siege of  La Paz in 1781. The siege clearly had racial implications, 
as Katari’s intent was to rid the region of  Europeans. Recent historical research on the 
siege of  La Paz has characterized it as a race war (Thomson 2002, 185).  The siege led to 
many deaths--most due to starvation as the city of  La Paz ran out of  food because it was 
cut off  from agricultural areas for 109 consecutive days (Serulnikov 2003, 194). 
In La Paz, Katari’s siege continues to instill fear in the mestizo classes (Albó 1987, 
379), and roadblocks attempting to sever La Paz’s access to the rest of  the country re-
main a simple, inexpensive, frequently used, and remarkably efficient political tactic. Dur-
ing October of  2003, food and fuel shortages were reported in La Paz as anti-Goni 
protests blocked the roads that bring food into the city from surrounding agricultural 
areas (Gotkine 2003).
Katarismo positions itself  against mestizaje or state-encouraged mixing of  indig-
enous and European cultures with the goal of  eventually constructing a homogenous 
Latin American culture. Katarist-inspired movements point out that the goal of  mestiza-
je is the dilution of  indigenous culture (Canessa 2000, 115). Mestizaje does not eliminate 
culture, but blends the cultural components of  the region, creating a notion of  “racial 
harmony” that masks the truth that the region is controlled by a single group (Rowe and 
Schelling 1991, 18).  Supporters of  Morales and the MAS party have been able to capi-
talize on Katarist ideals to garner the support of  traditional highland communities and 
indigenous groups whose territorial base, such as in the Cochabamba valley, is far from 
Katari’s original highland home.  
In general, mestizaje tends to be well-accepted by the non-indigenous sector of  
Bolivia.  As in many other parts of  Latin America, the Bolivian social and economic elite 
who adopted European customs dominate the country’s political and economic spheres, 
while indigenous peoples (the majority population in most parts of  the country) remain 
disenfranchised. Some traditional indigenous communities, however, are critical of  the 
racially and culturally mixed states that have become a demographic mainstay throughout 
Latin America. This is represented in a variety of  ways, including the wipala (the flag of  
indigenous Bolivia) that shows separate distinct blocks of  color symbolizing distinct cul-
ture groups. The bright colors of  the wipala do not blend to create a soft rainbow effect. 
It is a patchwork quilt with each color square standing separate and unique. The MAS 
party has adopted the wipala as symbol, and political figures such as President Morales 
are frequently photographed with a wipala in the background. 
Indigenous symbols are powerful and their use by indigenous leaders is carefully 
calculated. Of  course, indigenous communities have been influenced by outsiders since 
at least the Inca conquest of  the highlands. Andean women’s dress, including the charac-
teristic English bowler hat and pleated skirts worn by cholas (the women who dominate 
market activity in La Paz), is a classic example. Thus, indigenous communities continue 
to strive to remain identified as indigenous (and not mestizo) and to fight against the 
mestizaje processes, despite their cultures having obvious multiple influences. Radcliffe 
(2000) points out that the female leadership of  the indigenous movement in Ecuador 
adopted the custom of  wearing traditional Andean clothing, whereas before they wore 
westernized clothes.  In a parallel context Wood comments that “Rigoberta Menchú 
adopted traditional Mayan dress as she became an international human rights leader” 
(2001). Adopting traditional dress, or at least rejecting the western suit and tie, can lend 
authenticity to an indigenous leader who hopes to remain credible with his/her con-
stituents. Evo Morales refused to wear a suit and tie as he gained prominence in national 
politics. Instead, he favored a sweater that has come to symbolize his populist roots and 
opposition to the trappings of  mestizo power. 
Aymara youth living in the city of  El Alto are using rap music to articulate their 
frustrations with a political and economic system that discriminates against them. One 
song by the group ‘Uka Mau y Ke’ examines the 2003 rebellion that started when Presi-
dent Sánchez de Lozada launched his proposal to export natural gas. They rap about how 
“bullets are being shot at the people … we can’t put up with this because the people are 
reclaiming their rights.” It continues with “We are mobilized, arming street barricades. 
We are mobilized without noticing that we are killing brothers.” The rap denounces “cor-
rupt governments…with closed eyes that don’t look at the reality in the society.” (Dangl 
2006). Aymara rappers effectively use a global youth culture to confront the cultural and 
economic elite who support their subordination in the global economy.  
Non-governmental organizations and the working group known as the Taller de 
Historia Oral Andina provide a space for Aymara intellectuals to foster counter-hegemonic 
understandings of  Andean history, political action and territorial demands (Stephenson 
2002). Their goals include fostering indigenous organizational structures such as ayllus 
and “reconstructing and strengthening indigenous authorities” (THOA 2006). Sílvia Ri-
vera Cusicanqui, a well-know Aymara intellectual, was a founding member of  this group 
and played a key role in laying the ground work in the 1970s to foster indigenous pride. 
This organization and others have helped traditional communities to oppose neo-liberal 
economic policies for decades. 
Economic Globalization in the Lowlands
If  the goal of  the contemporary radical Katarista movement in the Bolivian high-
lands is to foster an autonomous nation separated from non-indigenous Bolivia (Sanjinés 
2002), their struggle is closely watched by mestizo groups in the lowlands who also argue 
that they want more regional autonomy. Mestizo groups in the lowlands, in particular a 
group who call themselves the Camba Nation, have embraced much of  the rhetoric of  
the highlands as they forge their own movement (Lowrey 2006). 
People in the eastern lowland city of  Santa Cruz, and to a lesser extent the city of  
Tarija, envision a country where they enjoy more freedom from a national government 
that seems overly concerned with the demands of  the highland population. A move-
ment of  Cambas (mestizos of  lowland indigenous Guaraní and European heritage) has 
successfully integrated their culture identity with a neoliberal economic agenda (Ballvé 
2005).  The Camba movement combines a historic mistrust of  bureaucracy and the deci-
sions made by the elite in the distant city of  La Paz to feed the desires of  the lowland 
population for more autonomy and control over the production and sale of  the natural 
gas that is found in the lowlands (Lowrey 2006, Román 2005, Stearman 1985). 
The indigenous groups of  lowland Bolivia, part of  the larger Guaraní family and 
known locally as the Chiquitanos, have their own rich histories (Murrieta 2005, Parejas, 
Alcides and Suárez Salas 1992, Ros and Combés 2003, Tomichá 2002). They are increas-
ingly articulating demands for their traditional lands and have staged several well-publi-
cized marches from Santa Cruz to La Paz (a march of  1,000 kilometers including gain 
in elevation of  over 3000 meters) to draw attention to their cause (El Deber 31 October 
2006). 
More so than in the highlands, people of  the lowlands have embraced European 
styles of  dress and standards of  beauty. In 2004, Miss Bolivia, a native of  Santa Cruz, the 
industrial, agricultural and banking center close to large natural gas reserves, created an 
international scandal by commenting that 
“Unfortunately, people who don’t know Bolivia very much think 
that we are all just Indian people,” adding that the image typified 
La Paz, which has “poor people and very short people and Indian 
people ... I’m from the other side of  the country. We are tall and we 
are white people and we know English.” (quoted in Bridges 2004).
Following these comments, a variety of  groups including some elite-dominated 
institutions, called for her resignation. The young woman from Santa Cruz expressed 
succinctly the racial divide that separates highland and lowland Bolivia and the percep-
tion in Santa Cruz that outsiders know of  only the Andes. 
The November/December 2004 issue of  the NACLA Report on the Americas en-
titled “Bolivia Fights Back” portrays the struggles in Bolivia as one of  heroic indig-
enous resistance fighting in the highlands or in the coca-producing areas of  the country. 
In a subsequent issue of  the Report Ballvé (2005) discusses the separatist movement 
in the eastern lowlands but his analysis is limited to two pages. It is very likely that 
NACLA will continue to publish relevant articles on Bolivia and the importance of  
the movement in the eastern lowlands will be discussed in detail. However, the title 
of  the 2004 issue merits scrutiny. Against who is Bolivia “fighting back”? Surely some 
are fighting against neoliberal reforms that further undermine the average Bolivian’s 
capacity to provide for their families. However, pro-economic globalization policies 
are strongly supported in various sectors of  the Bolivian population and not just by 
mestizos in the lowlands. El Alto has a strong manufacturing and export sector and 
a constituency that can be surprisingly pro-globalization (Laruta 2005). T-shirts worn 
by proud mestizos in the city of  Santa Cruz proclaim “Yo soy Boliviano” (I am Bo-
livian) and strengthening political movements claim to protect the rights of  mestizos. 
Growing Dissent in the Eastern Lowlands 
Neoliberal and capitalist pressures do not come uni-directionally from outside 
the country. Bolivia has its fair share of  home grown neoliberals and capitalists, many of  
whom have strong ties to the eastern, natural-gas rich, region. Portraits and biographical 
sketches of  some of  Santa Cruz’s leading capitalists reveal a group of  men with varied 
but strongly European cultural heritage (Lora 2005).  Without a doubt, international 
business is a strong political force in Bolivia but it would not be able to survive without 
the commitment of  Bolivians who embrace its philosophy and prescriptions. The Santa 
Cruz Civic Committee is well-known in Bolivia for its ties to Bolivia’s business elite 
(Buitrago 2005). This group of  elite mestizo men is energizing the eastern part of  the 
country with rhetoric that mirrors that used effectively on the altiplano (Lowrey 2006). 
They appeal to a sense of  regional and cultural pride that stresses their unique (non-
Andean) culture.
In Bolivia, the phrase Media Luna (Half  Moon) refers to the country’s eastern arc 
of  states including Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca, Tarija, Pando and Beni. The Media Luna’s 
regional identity is organized around a shared mestizo culture that places itself  in op-
position to the indigenous highlands. The culture of  the state of  Tarija (which borders 
Argentina) might be decidedly different from that of  the state of  Pando (which is part 
of  the Amazon region) but the people in these states affirm that they are different from 
people in the highlands. Although indigenous groups such as the Guaraní are found in 
large numbers in the region, mestizo culture dominates.
One of  the prominent political groups working on behalf  of  this region is the 
Movimiento Nación Camba de Liberación (Movement for the Liberation of  the Camba 
Nation). This movement was founded in 2001 and is based in the city of  Santa Cruz. 
Cambas boast strong European cultural ties that bear little resemblance to those of  the 
Aymara and Quechua speaking peoples of  the highlands. Cambas argue that they provide 
much of  the real wealth in the country, at least in terms of  legal foreign exports, and 
resent having to share their relative wealth with the highlands (Costas 2005). 
The people of  Santa Cruz (and to a lesser extent Tarija and other eastern states) 
are now asserting themselves as a political force and challenging assumptions about their 
ability to rally support for their causes. The most visible manifestations of  the political 
efforts of  the people of  Santa Cruz are the autonomy movement and the formulation 
of  a Law of  Hydrocarbons in 2004 with favorable terms for the eastern, natural gas-
producing, states. 
A town meeting brought 300,000 people into the streets of  Santa Cruz on  Janu-
ary, 28, 2005, to support autonomy. Although the real meaning of  the meeting, and in 
fact what the people of  Santa Cruz actually mean by “autonomy”, has been challenged 
and discussed widely in the Bolivian press, the rally clearly demonstrated that mestizos 
in Santa Cruz can mobilize a population just as well as the indigenous leaders of  the 
highlands (Lora 2005). As surely as indigenous communities in the highlands exert influ-
ence over political process in Bolivia through taking to the streets, mestizo groups in the 
lowlands can use similar means to further their own political agenda. Their movement, at 
its core, is pro-economic globalization. The commodity that they hope to sell in a global 
market is natural gas. The struggle over resources hinges on whether people support 
domestic consumption or export promotion. 
It is difficult not to romanticize the struggles of  the indigenous groups and con-
demn the actions of  the mestizos as selfish or solely the work of  transnational financial 
interests. This confrontation could be characterized as one of  rich mestizo capitalists 
against poor indigenous farmers, but poverty and exploitation are not the sole province 
of  highland groups. Clearly, large areas of  highland Bolivia suffer from grinding intrac-
table poverty. However, sections of  the lowlands also share the same indicators. Poor 
nutrition and lack of  access to education and medical care are still major social concerns 
throughout the country.
Goni the Gringo: A Presidency in Two Parts
It is not unusual in Bolivia for a president to serve two non-consecutive terms. 
Sometimes these two terms have decidedly different characters. Hugo Banzer, a military 
dictator who seized power in the 1970s, was democratically elected in 1997. Victor Paz 
Estenssoro served four terms as president-- the first during the famous 1952 Bolivian 
Revolution. He returned to the Presidency in 1985 and set the stage for policies that later 
took away many of  the reforms of  the 1952 Revolution. Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, 
also served two terms as president. However, during both terms, Goni was widely re-
garded as part of  the international business establishment and a supporter of  the inter-
ests of  the mestizo class. The Wall Street Journal reported favorably on Gonzalo Sánchez 
de Lozada’s plan to privatize state industries and commented that “the advance guard of  
international business is coming to the top of  the Andes” (Hendrix 1995).   
Goni’s First Term 
During Sánchez de Lozada’s first term of  office (1993-1997), many considered 
him a puppet of  the United States embassy and often ridiculed him for his gringo accent 
and Yankee ways. Goni grew up in the United States, attended the University of  Chicago, 
and only as an adult returned to his ancestral home, where he built a fortune in the min-
ing business. Early in his political career, he earned a reputation for closely following 
IMF and World Bank recommendations including the privatization of  public companies. 
Amid much protest, and with tremendous human cost, Bolivia privatized the national oil, 
telephone, electricity, mining, airline, and railway companies by the mid-1990s (Gill 2000, 
Kaimowitz and Thiele 1999, Kohl 2006, Schroeder 2000).  
Bolivian regionalism, in its current form, was fostered by The Law of  Popular 
Participation in the 1990s. This law was part of  a comprehensive seven point agenda 
called the Plan de Todos (Plan for Everyone), enacted in 1993 by Sánchez de Lozada, 
that allowed for some decision-making at the local level along with some state revenues 
for local development projects (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 126). It also eased the entry 
of  transnationals into Bolivian markets with long lasting and widespread implications 
(Perreault 2005, Sanabria 1999). Neoliberal reform in Bolivia is part of  wider political 
and economic movements that, in part, are responding to transnational pressures for 
economic liberalization and decentralization of  the government. Perrault (2005) has 
argued that in Bolivia, political and economic restructuring is conducted to enhance 
political stability and democratic participation with an eye towards encouraging foreign 
investment. As the autonomy movement gains strength in the eastern region of  Bo-
livia, a strong undercurrent of  the autonomy debate is the freedom to allow more inde-
pendent economic decision- making, including over issues of  taxation (Springer 2005). 
Goni’s Second Term
The Kataristas of  the 1970s drew attention to United States influence over the 
Bolivian Government.  Sílvia Rivera Cusicanqui (1991) suggests that the Kataristas used 
this strategy to raise national support for their movement and to help broaden their base 
from the altiplano to other regions. The question of  Bolivian autonomy and United 
States influence in Bolivian internal affairs remains a politically charged issue. For ex-
ample, it was widely reported in 2002 that after the United States’ Ambassador to Bolivia 
condemned presidential candidate Evo Morales, public support for him throughout Bo-
livia dramatically increased (Ralston 2002). Morales came in second in the election, and 
he thanked the United States ambassador for his help.
Sánchez de Lozada, who emerged from the 2002 election as President, was Evo 
Morales’ opposite in every way. The political protests that brought down Goni in his 
second term in October 2003 were the result of  Katarist-inspired indigenous movements 
but they could not have succeeded without a broader base of  support. A wide variety of  
events could have sparked the protests that ended Goni’s presidency. For example, the 
legal cultivation of  coca leaves has long been a cause of  political turmoil and Morales had 
his political start as the head of  the Coca Growers Union. However, it was the announce-
ment that Goni would allow foreign companies to export natural gas that brought long-
simmering tensions to a head (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 120; Orgáz García 2004, 264). 
Perreault (2006, 161-162) identifies the formation of  a National Coordinator for 
the Defense of  Gas, led by the well-known activist Óscar Olivera as one of  four principal 
factors that increased pressure on the Goni regime in 2002-2003.  (Óscar Olivera had 
risen to international prominence as a leader in Cochabamba’s Water War in 2000.) As 
mentioned previously, a key tactic used by protestors throughout Bolivia is the roadblock. 
Groups opposed to the terms of  sale of  Bolivian natural gas organized numerous suc-
cessful and long-running roadblocks around the country. In September 2003, Sánchez 
de Lozada sent the Bolivian military to “rescue” stranded tourists (domestic and inter-
national) in the resort town of  Sorata. A confrontation led to the death of  six people, 
including an eight-year old girl (El Deber 21 September 2003). Protests and roadblocks 
intensified after this incident, bringing in wider support from those who disagreed with 
Goni’s handling of  the incident. 
On October 12, 2003 when violence erupted again and the first protestors in the 
city of  El Alto were killed, demonstrations against the President grew in magnitude and 
intensity. Within days, Goni was no longer viable as president. Fifty-three people were 
killed in the political disturbances. At the core of  these protests, and in the eventual 
overthrow of  Goni, is a deeply-held conviction, long articulated by the Kataristas, that 
the mestizo government does not take indigenous concerns, and indeed indigenous lives, 
seriously. After days of  protest and negotiation, Goni fled to the United States.
The “Gas War,” as it has been called, was not so much over the sale of  natural gas, 
but over who would reap the most benefits from the sale. (See Perrault 2006 for a com-
parison of  the Gas Wars to the Cochabamba Water Wars). The indigenous peoples of  
Bolivia have long been exploited because of  their country’s bountiful natural resources 
and were not going to sit by passively and watch it happen again. Many Bolivians were 
disagreed with a proposal to build a gas pipeline that would have run to the Pacific Ocean 
through Chile. The War of  the Pacific (1879-83), when Bolivia lost its coastline to Chile, 
is still an important topic in Bolivia, and the notion that Chile would benefit from the 
sale of  natural gas enraged Bolivians across a wide political spectrum (Orgáz García 
2004, 264).
The popular uprising that led to the ouster of  Sánchez de Lozada clearly dem-
onstrates the broad anti-economic globalization movement has strong support at least 
among certain highland groups. However, Goni’s resignation was complex in its meaning 
and a failure of  political systems at a variety of  scales and it would be a great simplifi-
cation to claim that it was just about the sale of  natural gas.  The Katarist movement 
has been reborn in the Andes as an effective political opposition to forces broadly de-
scribed as globalization and has become politically viable through the efforts of  indig-
enous leaders such as Felipe Quispe and Evo Morales. Although these two men are rivals, 
they both have strived to ensure that indigenous Bolivians benefit from engagement in 
the world economy. When Morales took office in January 2006, he did so with a rarely 
achieved majority in the nation election and a broad mandate from the Bolivian people. 
Regional Evidence of  the Highland-Lowland Divide and what it means 
for Economic Globalization 
The 2004 Natural Gas Referendum 
In the aftermath of  the violence that brought down President Sánchez de Lozada, 
Carlos Mesa, the new or “Constitutional” President, held a referendum on natural gas. 
In July of  2004, the Bolivian people went to the polls. There was some confusion about 
whether or not voting was compulsory and nationwide the voter participation rate was 
around 60%, which is lower than typical in Bolivia (CNE 2004). Some political groups 
urged their constituents to boycott the election because of  the way that certain questions 
were worded. Labor unions, civic commitees and political parties all took stances on the 
referendum (Arrarás and Deheza 2005). Some groups campaigned for people to cast 
“blank” votes in protest (Casteño 2005). Despite low voter turn out, confusion, and a sig-
nificant number of  blank votes, regional patterns can be discerned from the referendum 
with a split between some highland and lowland departments.
Five propositions appeared on the referendum dealing with different aspects of  
natural gas. The referendum was long, some of  the questions were complexly worded, 
and it is possible that many people did not understand what they were voting for. The 
text of  the provisions and the results are shown in Table 1. Four types of  results were 
reported for each question: invalid; blank; yes; and no.  In general, the results were re-
ported in the international press as victory for President Carlos Mesa’s plan to go ahead 
with the development of  the export sector (e. g. Benson 2004).  However, even the most 
basic analysis of  the results reveals complexity and regional divisions. 
The first question asked whether the Hydrocarbon Law (No. 1689) passed during 
the second Sánchez de Lozada administration should be repealed—this law was viewed 
as being pro-transnational corporations.  The answer was a resounding ‘yes’ with a strong 
majority of  voters in every state. Nationwide, 77% of  the valid votes supported the re-
peal of  the law. Only 12% voted ‘no’. However, in the state of  Santa Cruz over 18% of  
the voters said ‘no’. When one considers the large number of  blank and invalid votes, 
18% saying ‘no’ to the repeal is significant. Although this law was unpopular, it was less 
unpopular in the state of  Santa Cruz. People in Santa Cruz stood to benefit substantially 
from the provisions for the export of  natural gas outlined in the law. In the state of  
Tarija, which holds the vast majority of  Bolivia’s natural gas, over 80% of  the votes cast 
were ‘yes’ and only 8% were ‘no.’ This reflects the particular political climate of  Tarija and 
a local interpretation that the Hydrocarbon Law was not supportive enough of  transna-
tional gas interests (Casteño 2005).
The second question asked if  the state should recover ownership over all hy-
drocarbons at the wellhead—this question approached the idea of  nationalization of  
the natural gas supply. The question was answered ‘yes’ by a large majority of  voters 
(82%) nationwide with the smallest majority in the state of  Santa Cruz (78%). More 
revealing might be the percentage of  ‘no’ votes, which could be interpreted as a rejec-
tion of  nationalization. In Santa Cruz, 12% of  the votes were ‘no.’ In the highland state 
of  Potosí, 6% were ‘no.’ These results are not surprising given the disparate interests of  
these states.
The third question asked if  the state-oil company should be re-founded (it had 
previously been partially privatized). A vote of  ‘yes’ can be interpreted as a rejection of  
privatization. Nationally, this received an approval of  almost 78%.  This provision passed 
in every state but Cochabamba where 13% of  the votes cast were blank (or protest) 
votes. The next smallest majority of  ‘yes’ votes (71%) was in Santa Cruz and Santa Cruz 
had a large percentage of  ‘no’ votes ( 20%).  These votes show Santa Cruz’s more favor-
able stance on privatization. In the highland state of  Potosí, over 80% of  the votes cast 
said that the state oil company should be re-founded and about 8% of  the votes said 
‘no.’ Tarija’s votes are hard to interpret and probably reflect the local political dynamics 
(Casteño 2005). 
Question four asked if  people agreed with the policy of  using gas to recover vi-
able access to the sea. This question raised the issue of  Bolivia’s strained relationship with 
Chile and the potential that natural gas could be used to leverage access to the Pacific. 
This question is clear evidence of  Bolivia’s perpetual struggle to regain what they lost 
during the War of  the Pacific. Unfortunately, the responses to this question were mixed 
and viewed by observers as an indication that people did not understand the question 
(Centellas 2004).
 The fifth and final question on the referendum asked about the export of  
gas.  Nationwide, 53% of  votes supported this proposition. In the gas-rich eastern part 
of  the country, in particular in the state of  Tarija, 74% of  the voters said ‘yes.’ Other 
Media Luna states, Santa Cruz (61% ‘yes’), Pando (72% ‘yes’), and Beni (68% ‘yes’) dem-
onstrated they were interested in finding an international market for natural gas. This 
question received its lowest approval in the state of  Potosí (38%). In the states of  Oruro 
(44% ‘yes’), Cochabamba (49% ‘yes’), and La Paz (50% ‘yes’) this question was not widely 
supported. The highlands, where the idea that gas should be used domestically is popular 
(Orgáz García 2004), voted against exporting natural gas. 
Longstanding contracts already exist to export Bolivian natural gas to Argentina, 
and Brazil is a major investor in the Bolivian gas industry. In the lowland states these inter-
national markets are prized. In the highland states, in particular in the state of  Potosí, the 
international sale of  natural gas is viewed with suspicion. After all, Potosí is at the center 
of  Bolivia’s famous and struggling mining industry. Few people know the economic (and 
literal) dangers of  selling natural resources to the world market like the people of  Potosí. 
The results of  this referendum, rather than provide a mandate for transnational export 
of  gas, as was widely reported in the international press, demonstrate strong regional 
divisions that have deep roots and implications that reach beyond the natural gas sector. 
The referendum results have been used by President Morales and his supporters to justify 
the nationalization of  the gas reserves in May of  2006 (Parenti 2006).   
The 2004 Municipal Elections
Following the 2003 crises, the Bolivian political party system did not provide much 
hope for the resolution of  conflicts over representation, natural gas, coca production and 
a long list of  domestic issues (Zuazo 2004). Domingo (2005) comments on the fragility 
of  Bolivian democracy and explains that Bolivia’s commitment to democracy since the 
Table 1. Results of  2004 Gas Referendum by Department.
Source: Corte Nacional Electoral. 2004.  http://www.cne.org.bo  (Accessed 13 
June, 2006). Note: These calculated percentages obviously include errors, where 
totals round to more than 101%. They are, however, roughly the same as other 
results citing CNE. See Arrarás and Deheza. 2005. These small differences do not 
change the analysis.
Voter Participation Rate for the 2004 Gas Referendum
BOL Beni CHQ CBB LPZ ORU Pando SCZ POI TJA
Part. 60% 49% 62% 61% 65% 67% 54% 53% 60% 58%
Provision One: Do you agree that the Hydrocarbons Law (No. 1689) approved 
by Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada should be repealed? 
BOL Beni CHQ CBB LPZ ORU Pando SCZ POI TJA
yes 77% 73% 82% 77% 77% 77% 79% 70% 78% 81%
no 12% 13% 8% 11% 10% 10% 12% 18% 9% 8% 
blank 12% 14% 10% 12% 13% 13% 10% 12% 13% 11%
Provision Two: Do you agree that the state should recover ownership over all 
hydrocarbons at the wellhead?  
BOL Beni CHQ CBB LPZ ORU Pando SCZ POI TJA
yes 82% 79% 86% 84% 82% 83% 85% 78% 83% 86%
no 8% 8% 5% 7% 7% 6% 7% 12% 6% 5% 
blank 11% 14% 9% 10% 12% 11% 9% 11% 12% 10%
Provision Three: Do you agree that YPFB (the state-oil company) should be re-
founded, recovering the state's ownership of stakes held in the part-privatized 
oil companies, so that it can take part in all the stages of the hydrocarbon 
production chain? 
BOL Beni CHQ CBB LPZ ORU Pando SCZ POI TJA
yes 78% 76% 83% 44% 77% 80% 83% 71% 81% 83%
no 13% 14% 8% 49% 12% 10% 9% 20% 8% 7% 
blank 11% 12% 10% 13% 12% 11% 8% 11% 12% 10%
Provision Four: Do you agree with President Carlos Mesa's policy of using gas 
as a strategic resource to recover sovereign and viable access to the sea? 
BOL Beni CHQ CBB LPZ ORU Pando SCZ POI TJA
yes 47% 61% 48% 44% 46% 41% 66% 49% 33% 68%
no 39% 23% 38% 42% 39% 44% 22% 37% 50% 18%
blank 15% 16% 14% 13% 15% 15% 12% 14% 16% 14%
Provision Five: Do you agree that Bolivia should export gas under a national 
policy framework that ensures supplies for Bolivians; encourages the 
industrialization of gas on national territory; levies taxes and/or royalties on oil 
companies up to 50% of the production value of oil and gas; and earmarks 
resources from the export and industrialization of gas mainly for education, 
health, roads and jobs? 
BOL Beni CHQ CBB LPZ ORU Pando SCZ POI TJA
yes 53% 68% 52% 49% 50% 44% 72% 61% 38% 74%
no 33% 17% 34% 38% 35% 40% 16% 26% 46% 12%
blank 14% 15% 14% 13% 15% 14% 12% 14% 16% 13%
return to civilian rule in 1982 has benefited the ruling political class. Until the 2005 
Presidential elections, political parties were increasingly fractured and regional, with few 
having significant power throughout the country. 
In the 2004 municipal elections including the nine state capitals and the impor-
tant highland city of  El Alto, no party received the most votes in more than one city. 
Morales’ MAS Party received the second most votes in three cities (La Paz, El Alto and 
Cochabamba) and the most total votes in the country (18.5%).  The cities of  La Paz, 
El Alto and Cochabamba share key characteristics that make the MAS party attractive, 
most importantly, large and politically-active indigenous populations.  However, even this 
assumption about political allegiance should not be taken for granted. “El Alto no es…
políticamente homogéneo. La cuidad de Santa Cruz tampoco.” (El Alto is not politically 
homogeneous. Nor is the city of  Santa Cruz) (Laruta 2005).  In fact, the poor predomi-
nately indigenous city of  El Alto is the key location for Bolivia’s growing involvement in 
clothing exports and has showed strong support for trade ties to international markets.
The 2005 Presidential Elections
In 2005, President Carlos Mesa received stiff  criticism from a wide spectrum of  
Bolivian society because he refused to use force to break up roadblocks. During the first 
week in March of  2005, passage to the international airport in El Alto was effectively cut 
off, stranding Bolivians and international visitors alike. The public’s criticism of  Mesa’s 
handling of  the crisis severely undercut his political authority.  As roadblock after road-
block besieged the country, Morales emerged as a serious contender for the Presidency. 
Bolivians commented that they could stop the blockades by putting the blockader, Mo-
rales, in office (Ordóñez 2005). 
The emergence of  the MAS party and the unprecedented election of  Morales 
as President marked a new era in Bolivian politics. Both of  the parties that did well 
in the 2005 presidential elections were newly formed and closely identified with their 
presidential candidate. MAS was founded in 1997 and is closely associated with Morales. 
Former Bolivian President Jorge Fernando “Tuto” Quiroga Ramírez founded the right-
wing Podemos organization as the vehicle for his 2005 presidential campaign. It remains 
unclear if  either of  these groups will continue to have power once their figureheads retire 
from politics.
Podemos, with its base in Santa Cruz, competed well against Morales’ MAS Party 
in the 2005 elections in the eastern party of  the country. Podemos and its leader Quiro-
ga represented the interests of  the mestizo class. Podemos did poorly in the highlands 
where the MAS Party clearly dominated (Figure 2).  Not surprisingly, MAS also did well 
in the lowland regions associated with coca growing. 
Although Podemos won, MAS did surprisingly well (33%) in the gas-rich lowland 
state of  Santa Cruz and in the southern state of  Tarija (32%).  This is partially a sign 
of  the deep frustration felt by many Bolivians over the protests that heated up in 2004. 
Some Bolivians feared that their country would never get out of  the cycle of  political 
unrest organized by MAS (Calabi 2005, Casteño 2005). 
With one exception (in the northern state of  the Pando), provinces in Bolivia that 
have experienced increased poverty in the period from 1991 to 2001 voted for MAS. 
Similarly, most of  the provinces that  voted for Podemos have seen substantial reductions 
in poverty over the same time period.  Interestingly, provinces where people have seen 
both a substantial reduction in poverty and voted for MAS are in the urban areas such as 
El Alto, La Paz, Cochabamba and Sucre, or in rural areas that are part of  Bolivia’s coca 
growing zones, the very place that MAS and Morales got their start. 
Figure 2. Party with the Most Votes in the 2005 Presidential Election. Source: 
CNE (Corte Nacional Electoral). 2005. http://www.cne.org.bo (13 June, 2006). 
Conclusions
Much has been made in the international press over the election of  Evo Morales 
(see Lerager 2006). Morales as been depicted as a radical left-wing ideologue, or alterna-
tively, as a savior to the indigenous poor of  the hemisphere. In Bolivia, he is under pres-
sure from indigenous leaders such as Felipe Quispe to deliver on his promised reforms. 
The nationalization of  the natural gas fields on May 1st 2006 was, in part, a response to 
his radical critics who were criticizing him for his failure to act on some of  his campaign 
promises. 
Nash’s analysis of  globalization or “glocalization” in Chiapas, Mexico, points to 
the larger context that resource conflicts play as indigenous groups contest globalization. 
Morales’ nationalization of  the natural gas fields did more than assert state control over a 
critical natural resource. It signaled to the world (and to his political rivals) that he would 
push forward with a broader anti-neo-liberal economic agenda and markedly improve the 
quality of  life of  Bolivia’s indigenous majority. He vowed to use the country’s resources 
in a way that favored increasing domestic consumption over export and take seriously 
the state’s responsibilities to the poor. 
Perhaps surprising to those who live outside Bolivia, Morales enjoyed high ap-
proval ratings right after his election. After he nationalized Bolivia’s natural gas fields 
in May 2006, his approval rating dropped from a previous high of  75% to 68%. (La 
Razón 2006). In August 2006, his approval rating was 81%, and it has since slipped and 
fluctuates as domestic and international events impact the country (Program on Inter-
national Policy Attitudes 2006). However broad his personal popularity, he faces serious 
obstacles as he attempts to govern the country and he is a long way from resolving 
Bolivia’s underlying regional divisions. Among the most important of  these is a growing 
gap between rich and poor and diverging visions of  what it means to be a Bolivian in 
the 21st Century. 
Keeling (2004) notes the trauma to Latin American societies from the “growing 
polarization of  society” caused by globalization. The debate over economic globaliza-
tion is not an abstract theoretical concept to many in Bolivia. It is a “glocalized” impact. 
People know if  they are better or worse off  than before. Significantly, if  they follow 
the national news or talk to travelers, they have a sense for how different regions of  the 
country are faring, as well. When highland indigenous populations vote for Morales and 
the MAS party they are voting for a change in their economic well-being. When lowland 
mestizo populations support Podemos they are hoping for more economic indepen-
dence and growth. These two regions in the country have different agendas because they 
are impacted differently by engagement in the global economy.
Keeling (2004) comments that globalization can exacerbate conflicting socio-cul-
tural identities. Powerful political movements may have drawn their base of  support from 
Katarista groups based on the altiplano, but the anti-economic globalization movement 
has implications far beyond the highlands. Sánchez de Lozado, with his strong US back-
ing, was a lightning rod for what is widely perceived as United States hegemony in Boliv-
ian (and Latin American) affairs. Goni was uniquely ill equipped to negotiate the opposi-
tion that developed over the sale of  natural gas. Political groups such as Morales’ MAS 
party, with its strong indigenous identity, succeeded in winning the 2005 election because 
it reached beyond its initial core group of  coca growers. Morales positioned himself  as 
the leader of  Bolivia’s oppressed indigenous majority and opposed the state at every turn. 
However, the Morales presidency is confronted by opposition from the right and from 
the left and is in a difficult relationship with the United States, especially because of  his 
friendship with Hugo Chávez of  Venezuela.
These disparate movements, indigenous communities in the highlands and mesti-
zos in the lowlands, are both largely empowered by their sense of  place. A geography of  
globalization exists at a number of  scales within Bolivia. Regional pride (which frequently 
overlaps with ethnic self  identification) is a strong force in Bolivia. People are quick to 
identify themselves as being from a particular part of  the country and all regions have 
their stereotyped personality traits.  Both indigenous and mestizo groups stress their 
connections to the land and their rights to the resources within it. People in the lowlands 
argue that the riches of  their land (in this case, natural gas) are their patrimony, much like 
the richness of  the soil around Lake Titicaca. If  the people of  the altiplano have rights 
to their potato fields, why don’t people of  the lowlands have rights to their gas fields 
(Casteño 2005)? 
Geographers have become deeply engaged in issues concerning globalization. 
The term “glocalization” draws attention to the importance and complexity of  local 
places in these global processes. Our research should highlight the spatial realities, such 
as regional disparities that globalization exacerbates. Bolivia remains divided along ethnic 
and spatial lines. Bolivia has always been a multi-ethnic country with strong geographic 
forces dividing it. These divisions seem only to be growing under the promise of  great 
wealth for some Bolivians from the sale of  natural gas and the pressures of  economic 
globalization. As key sectors of  the Bolivian population struggle against an integration 
into the global economy that puts the demands of  a global market ahead of  the needs of  
a local population, others embrace globalization as the only rational approach to improv-
ing standards of  living in, at least, their region of  the country. 
It remains to be seen how Evo Morales will negotiate this tension. Recently, Bo-
livians such as Román (2005) have begun discussing the forging of  a new national iden-
tity that combines characteristics of  highland and lowland populations.  Morales’ Vice 
President, Alvaro García Linera has written about the importance of  establishing a truly 
multi-cultural nation and democratic government that allows for meaningful community 
rights based on traditional Andean practices. (García Linera, 2005). Solutions to Bolivia’s 
regional and cultural divides may emerge from these and other Bolivian intellectuals.  
The mestizo class in the lowlands is not going to disappear. They retain con-
siderable power and strong international connections. The indigenous populations 
of  the highlands will not quietly assimilate. They have struggled against European 
control for over 500 years and now that Bolivia has elected an indigenous president, 
they might finally find a voice in the halls of  government. The complexity of  Boliv-
ia’s engagement in the global economy and its strong regional characteristics will 
provide fruitful research opportunities for geographers for the foreseeable future. 
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